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Space has long been an area of deployment for military systems. Some 170 pure-
ly military satellites orbit the earth, performing functions for the armed forces 
like surveillance, early warning, communication and control. There are signs 
now that a threshold is being crossed in military use of space – in future weapons 
systems could be further developed to the point of deployment whose stationing 
on earth or in space could initiate an arms race.
On the initiative of the Subcommittee for Disarmament, Arms Control and 
Nonproliferation, the present TAB report uses space armament as an example to 
analyse the interaction between technological forces and political and military 
goals and paradigms. From the perspective of arms control policy, the report 
analysis the possibilities for stopping or containing developments which could 
evolve into a hazard to the security and stability of the international order.
TECHNOLOGICAL FORCES, CHALLENGE OF ARMS CONTROL
The great relevance of technology for defence policy and the role of modern 
armed forces is undisputed. New technologies make possible improvement in 
quality and force of weapon systems and units and open up novel options for 
political and military action. The use of improved and expanded technological 
options in the next few years can be expected to have decisive impact on the role 
and options for action of the military, the stability of the international order and 
ultimately warfare.
Arms control policy is facing these new challenges and must respond to struc-
tural changes in the international system and the pace of technology in the In-
formation Age. For this reason and also because of the changing defence policy 
environment, the agenda for a preventive arms control policy should be extend-
ed as early as possible to include evaluation and design of research, development 
and testing with military relevance and their consequences.
This also applies to scientific and technological developments in the field of 
military use of space. Not least because of new technological possibilities, space 
is increasingly being accorded a key function from the point of view of military 
planners and of the security policy of the leading military powers. Global ex-
penditure on military R&D is growing for concepts, technologies and systems. 
The use of space for security needs is becoming a central element in strategies, 
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doctrines and planning. The USA is the most important driving force behind this 
trend. Space is increasingly regarded there as a central civil and military resource 
with the highest priority. Its military uses opens up numerous options for gaining 
and securing information superiority, prevention, deterrence and waging war 
which the military and politicians perceive as attractive.
Of the developments listed, the focus is particularly on those which lead to the 
»weaponisation« of space through relatively passive use – for systems of sur-
veillance, communication and control. This addresses particularly the option of 
stationing weapons systems for use to, in and from space. From the perspective 
of arms control policy, this trend poses a problem, as it emerges that existing 
space law instruments and existing arms control agreements are unsuitable for 
slowing further militarisation of space, let alone preventing it.
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES: THE DOCTRINE OF »SPACE CONTROL«
Since the end of the face-off between the blocs and the Cold War, there has 
been a decisive change in the threat facing western security policy. The issue 
is no longer one of massive threat from a clearly identifiable competitor, but 
rather an accumulation of diffuse risks which are difficult to predict. Possible 
future crises and conflicts are ethno-political conflicts or conflicts over resourc-
es in specific regions, the threat and use of weapons of mass destruction by 
statal and substatal actors, and the danger of international terrorism, which has 
strongly influenced security policy debates since 11 September 2001. Experts 
believe that there is also a threat from »information operations« (»cyberwar«). 
Another threat which is emphasised is the proliferation of rockets, other launch 
platforms and satellites. At the beginning of 2001 US Defence Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld cited »missiles, terrorism and information warfare« in a single inter-
related context.
As the only remaining superpower, the USA feels particularly subject to these 
risks, and also challenged to respond to them at all levels. Through its new 
security policy concepts and goals, and through its actions it is accordingly de-
termining the content and pace of new developments which the other states feel 
are confronting them.
Since around the mid-90s, the key strategic US documents have increasingly 
been focusing on space in the discourse on military threats and capabilities. As 
an »area of responsibility«, space already represents a civil and military resource 
which is vulnerable to and threatened by hostile actors. However, space also 
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represents a medium which offers interesting military opportunities for taking 
protective measures, achieving deterrence, global information superiority and 
military superiority in and through space.
The report of the Space Commission set up by the Administration reached the 
following conclusions in 2001 based on its threat assessment:
> The USA is more dependent than any other country on the use of space. At the 
same time, its space systems are vulnerable.
> Countries hostile to the USA possess or are obtaining the means to disrupt or 
destroy US space systems.
> The USA accordingly presents an attractive target for a »space Pearl Harbor«.
Closely linked with the theme of the military significance of space is defence 
against attacking ballistic missiles. The number of states with long-range mis-
siles or corresponding programmes has not changed decisively in the last 20 
years. However, the focus has shifted to states like North Korea, Iran and Iraq 
which are objects of concern. Not least because of these, the assessment in US 
policy has become that a threat from ballistic missiles is possible in future to the 
USA and its inhabitants and is already present to US troops and interests abroad 
(together with its allies and friends). The events of 11 September 2001 are not 
officially seen as proving that the threat of international terrorism specifically 
cannot be averted with anti-missile defence systems. On the contrary, together 
with reduced offensive nuclear potential and improved conventional capabili-
ties, missile defence is now an integral component of a new triad for deterrence 
and the use of force if deterrence fails.
Even in 2001, the high-level commission headed by the present Defence Sec-
retary Donald Rumsfeld had classified US national security interests in space 
as national top priorities and recommended that the USA should develop the 
means to deter hostile attacks in and from space or defend against these (»space 
control«). These means also included weapons stationed in space. Plans and 
statements by the Bush Administration build on this, showing increased interest 
in the military use of space. Achieving »space superiority« is both a goal and a 
key aspect in the transformation of the US armed forces.
Recent discussions and activities are strong indications that in the USA the stage 
is being set for increased military use of space in future. After terminating the 
ABM agreement there is now scope to achieve the goal of transforming the US 
military in space as well. As a result, financial, technological and organisational 
efforts are being made in order to exploit, expand and protect existing possi-
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bilities and capabilities. In addition, the necessary technological capabilities are 
to be established in the national interest for both defensive and offensive use of 
space as a means of waging war. A high-ranking official expressed this new ori-
entation in a nutshell: »I believe that weapons will go into space. It’s a question 
of time. And we need to be at the forefront of that.«
THE TECHNOLOGICAL BASIS FOR KEY MILITARY FUNCTIONS
From the perspective of politicians and the military, new technologies play the 
key role in achieving the desired goals and military capabilities. Specifically, the 
»space control capabilities« and increasingly the »space force application capa-
bilities« are based on the assumption of advanced technologies and systems. For 
numerous military applications, increased research, development and demon-
stration activities are accordingly being implemented to create this basis. struc-
tures and keynotes are as follows:
A look at US military R&D planning helps form a picture of the promotion and 
objectives of the »enabling technologies«. Briefly summarised along the central 
»mission areas«, these structures and keynotes are as follows:
> For the space shuttle, there are efforts to improve propulsion technology. Close-
ly associated with this are further efforts to develop low-cost, low-maintenance 
reusable shuttles, to ensure rapid and flexible transport of payloads into space. 
A remote goal is the »space plane«, which can be operated in the same func-
tional way as an aircraft as the situation requires. Concepts for a »transatmos-
pheric aircraft« are being pursued with the aim of acquiring a means to main-
tain space superiority and to improve the global presence by rapid deployment 
from space at any point in the world.
> For the further improvement of satellite operations, two keynotes are propulsi-
on technologies and fuels. A striking trend is the development of small satelli-
tes. Highly-manoeuvrable microsatellites or service robots are opening up new 
possibilities for military deployment in combating foreign satellites.
> Satellites and other systems in space are support systems for controlling global 
military deployments on earth, and potentially also for the application of force 
in and from space. Improving their diverse functions, such as early warning, 
surveillance, guidance and communication or environmental monitoring was 
the aim inter alia of establishing global satellite systems such as the US Global 
Positioning System, and a network of antenna stations for controlling and ma-
naging the military’s own satellites. Work is in progress on improved sensors 
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for satellites to improve the early warning system and track missiles.
> Highly important are research and development efforts to provide usable we-
apons systems for use in space (such as »killer satellites«), from space (such as 
space-based laser weapons or kinetic energy weapons for striking targets on 
earth) and to space (such as air-based laser weapons to combat satellites).
WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR SPACE
Militarised space has long been a fact. A whole armada of satellites for purposes 
such as navigation, surveillance and communication is now in orbit. Specifically, 
they perform the function of »force multipliers« by increasing the efficiency of 
military operations on land, sea and air (»space force enhancement«). However, 
the USA has now set the stage for further advances: the aim is to limit the ca-
pabilities of potential opponents to use space-based systems for military action 
(»counter space«) and to develop US capabilities to threaten and apply force 
from space against terrestrial goals. The future potential of space is to be ful-
ly utilised by providing a range of »force application capabilities in, from and 
through space«.
What is the current state of space armament? Leaving aside unconfirmed re-
ports of Chinese parasite microsatellites, there are currently no implemented 
space-based weapons systems known. Space-based laser weapons and space-
based missiles (both for the purposes of missile defence) are just as much in the 
research and development stage as military microsatellites.
The USA and Russia have long had technological capabilities to disrupt and 
possible to destroy satellites from the ground (or air), and the technologies are 
being continuously upgraded. The Peoples Republic of China is also currently 
working on acquiring these capabilities. Besides lasers and high-power micro-
wave systems, these include primarily the technological competence of the USA 
and Russia in the form of air-based anti-satellite systems.
Any state with nuclear weapons is technologically in a position to use a high-at-
mosphere nuclear explosion to damage satellites (including their own) in a num-
ber of orbits. Further proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons 
could increase the number of states and substatal actors with this capability in 
the next few years.
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Attacks against the terrestrial part by satellite systems (conventional, electronic) 
offer yet another possibility for disrupting or damaging these, which is available 
to far more conceivable actors, as it involves less technological sophistication.
Besides these existing options for use of weapons in, from and through space, 
additional options can be expected in the near future. How might the further 
course of development look?
Considering the strategic thinking and goals in the US planning documents and 
the technologies discussed and pursued to achieve these goals, the following 
hypotheses can be formulated and presented for discussion on the further tech-
nological development of the weapons in question.
> There is much to suggest that microsatellites and service robots for use against 
other satellites may be a first step towards achieving the goal of comprehensive 
»space control«.
> Air-based laser weapons against (tactical) ballistic missiles are being developed 
on an ongoing basis. This could improve their suitability for use against space 
targets to the point where an air-based laser could become an efficient option.
> Development of ground-based kill vehicles for use against satellites is relatively 
far advanced. Due to further R&D activities in connection with missile defence 
projects, these developments are being accelerated, so that anti-satellite systems 
with kinetic energy (KE) warheads may soon be ready for deployment.
> Ground-based laser weapons for disruption are already available. Lasers to 
damage or destroy space targets are options which can be expected to be viable 
in the medium term.
> Ground-based high-power microwave weapons to disrupt satellites are capable 
of deployment in the short to medium term.
> Space-based laser weapons to destroy ballistic missiles (even before the end of 
firing) are currently being pursued with reduced effort, the deadlines for tests 
and stationing have been pushed well back.
> Space-based KE concepts for use against intercontinental ballistic missiles (in 
the launch phase) are being pursued further, despite the major technical prob-
lems to be solved.
From the arms control policy point of view, it is a fact that the military options 
listed here are not prohibited in any phase of development up to and including 
deployment.
Numerous states see this potential expansion of military space systems as a dan-
ger to the stability of the international order. The concern is that a global spiral 
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of measures and countermeasures could set off a general arms race. The question 
that arises here is whether and how arms control policy could prevent these pos-
sible developments.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND POLITICAL CONCEPTS FOR ARMS CONTROL
International arms control law and prevailing arms control agreements do not 
constrain the military use of space. As an overview, we can say:
Currently, stationing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in 
the earth’s orbit or on the moon etc, establishing military bases, testing weapons 
and manoeuvring on celestial bodies etc, any nuclear testing in space and mili-
tary or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having 
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects. Existing agreements accordingly do 
impose certain restrictions on the military use of space, but there are substantial 
gaps.
The current regime permits at least the use of military personnel for civilian pur-
poses, the stationing and use of satellites for surveillance, communication and 
navigation for military purposes, the stationing and defensive use of convention-
al weapons, and overflying by missiles and ASAT weapons (except for nuclear 
weapons) stationed in space. Since termination of the ABM agreement, tests and 
stationing of missile defence systems with non-nuclear space components are 
also permitted. Finally, there are no rules which set narrow limits to the use of 
space weapons.
Although the great majority of states have expressed concern for years about the 
danger of an arms race in space, there has been no further development of the 
legal regulatory structure for many years. One reason for this is that differences 
of opinion between the USA and China have blocked the Geneva Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) since the second half of the 90s. This blockade situation has 
become still more rigid recently. While the current US Administration empha-
sises that in its view the existing space arrangements are sufficient, China has 
made it clear that negotiations at the CD on other issues – and specifically on a 
ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes (FMCT – »Fissile 
Material Cut-Off«) – are dependent on more intensive work on the problem of a 
threatening arms race in space. For this purpose China presented with Russia a 
joint proposal to the CD on the question of space armament in May 2002.
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However, the Sino-Russian proposal and further initiatives by other actors at 
CD have also shown that recently there has been a move away from arms con-
trol policy maximal concepts. De facto, China, in cooperation with Russia, is 
taking more account of the US position, and is accordingly backing compromise 
solutions. China and Russia are no longer pressing for demands which would 
not only prevent the stationing of weapons in space (»weaponisation«) but also 
a missile defence system with space components, possibly because of their own 
interests in missile defence systems. The current Sino-Russian position focus-
es on regulation of space-based weapons through a ban on stationing. There 
is no more talk of regulating tests in space or terrestrial weapons which can 
reach space. All nations would accordingly be free to develop and test space-
based weapons to the point of deployment. In addition, deployment of a missile 
defence system with space components would be possible, provided that these 
components are not weapons (e.g. sensors).
Despite these signs of a closing of the gap, agreement on the core problems of 
space arms control (stationing weapons in space, and the ASAT issue) is still 
remote. Currently, the main issues are exploring ways to overcome the blockade 
and critically reviewing options for regulation. The large number of possible 
approaches to regulation which have been discussed can be roughly divided into 
two groups: Establishing bans on (space) weapons and confidence and securi-
ty-building measures for space (CSBM).
The most important categories in establishing bans on weapons are space-based 
weapons and ASAT systems. In addition, there is regulation of specific zones in 
space where e.g. weapons could be banned above a certain altitude.
CSBM may help (among other things) to increase the transparency of space ac-
tivities, to prevent aggressive actions and accidents or to promote cooperation 
in civil space travel. Such confidence and security building measures for space 
generally also include concepts which aim at establishing »Rules of the Road« 
for this area, or a »Code of Conduct« for space activities. Finally, there are other 
possibilities for action, such as unilateral waivers of space weapons by one or 
more states. Measures like this would have the aim of setting the issue of space 




ARMS CONTROL FOR SPACE – »MISSION IMPOSSIBLE«?
In view of the entrenched front between the USA and the other actors, it may 
seem utopic to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of possible arms con-
trol policy options for space. However, experience teaches that political configu-
rations are in a constant state of change at both national and international level. 
Efforts to achieve initial small advances should accordingly be continued.
From a pragmatic point of view, the chances of implementation and the attaina-
ble goals look more or less as follows:
> If we focus in the current situation on the priority of breaking up the existing 
blockade and bringing some movement into embedded positions, there is the 
option of initiating a process of discussion or negotiation without the USA (and 
other states not prepared to negotiate). This process could take place outside 
the CD, involving actors in civil society (such as NGOs active in this field). If 
the USA and other nations are kept away from negotiations, extensive agree-
ment should in fact be easier to achieve. This would, however, then have less 
importance for arms control policy than an agreement involving all the major 
space powers. Such a process is accordingly only worthwhile if there is sound 
reason to hope that the USA (and any other states not interested in negotiation) 
would be integrated into it during or after conclusion of the negotiations.
> Another option would aim to overcome the standstill by initiating a process 
of discussion or negotiation exclusively on confidence and security-building 
measures (CSBM). As the USA has indicated its willingness to engage in talks 
on these issues, this approach would have the advantage that the decisive actor 
was already on board. The price of this would be initially leaving aside discus-
sion of substantial arms control measures. Such an approach to political action 
would at first be concerned with goals capable of achievement in the short 
term, with the aim of creating a more favourable climate for negotiations with 
more relevance for arms control policy.
> The most difficult option to achieve is the third: here, the goal would be to 
achieve – with the participation of as many states as possible, including the 
USA – regulation of offensive and aggressive space weapons, starting at the le-
vel of a ban on stationing. The chance of integrating the USA in such a process 
currently seems extremely small and the danger of reaching deadlock in nego-
tiations seems great. However, the attempt to reach agreement with the USA 
at such a level (admittedly lower) on an arrangement including a substantial 
ban would be worth intensive diplomatic and civil efforts. The results of such a 
process of negotiation would be more valuable for arms control policy than a 
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comprehensive agreement without the USA or confidence and security building 
measures which ignored the core problems.
Developments in the last few years and the prospects for the immediate future 
do not justify any great hopes for a contemporary arms control policy for space. 
New technological developments and political initiatives on the one hand make 
this an extremely important field for preventive arms control policy action, and 
a majority of the international community and many NGOs see it in these terms. 
On the other hand, there is no real progress being made in tackling this area 
politically. Overcoming the current blockade in this area is accordingly the most 
important political challenge. In this situation, even small advances (such as ne-
gotiating individual confidence building measures for space) would be a worth-
while goal.
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